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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY-RIGHT OF PROSECUTION TO PRE-TRIAL
DISCOVERY-In a trial for rape, the defendant indicated an intention to
rely on his alleged impotency as a defense. The trial court thereupon
granted the prosecution's motion for discovery of all medical reports and
X-rays relating to the defendant's present physical condition, the names
and addresses of all physicians who had treated the defendant prior to trial,
and the names and addresses of all physicians who had been subpoenaed
to testify for the defendant. On petition by the defendant, the intermediate
appellate court issued a writ of prohibition restraining the enforcement
of the trial court's order.1 On review, held, reversed, two judges dissenting

1 Jones v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 2d 836, 17 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1962).
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in part.2 The prosecution is entitled to discover information pertinent to
evidence which the defendant intends to introduce in the nature of an
exculpatory defense; such information does not fall within the scope of
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Jones v. Superior Court,
372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
Criminal discovery3 was a practice foreign to the common law:' Its
development in contemporary systems of criminal procedure has been resisted on the grounds that it would compound the already disproportionate
procedural advantages enjoyed by the defendant, 5 facilitate subornation of
perjury and fabrication of evidence, 6 and enable the prosecution to encroach upon the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.7 Nonetheless, a number of jurisdictions have overcome such objections and held
that a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may compel the pre-trial
disclosure of the prosecution's case upon proper motion by the defendant. 8
2 The Supreme Court of California vacated the opinion of the lower court, and then
issued a peremptory writ of prohibition against the broad right of discovery granted by
the trial court, while at the same time directing that court to allow the discovery of
that evidence requested which the defendant actually intended to use at the trial.
3 Traditionally, the term discovery has been held to comprehend oral and written
depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories to adverse parties, notices for inspection
and copying, physical and mental examinations, and demands for admissions. However,
discovery would be more realistically defined as embracing all available instruments of
fact ascertainment. Thus, in a criminal case, such things as the identity of witnesses,
statements made at preliminary hearings, and scientific data collected by police laboratories would be proper subjects for discovery. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 56, 61 (1961).
4 See, e.g., King v. Holland, 4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). It would
appear that the common-law judges were unable to conceive of the granting of discovery
in a criminal case, and deemed it unnecessary to give a principled justification for denial
of requests for discovery by the defendant, other than saying that there was no precedent
for so doing.
5 E.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). In the course of his
opinion Judge Learned Hand said: "Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence;
he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of
the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him
to pick over at his leisure and make his defense fairly or foully, I have never been able
to see." Id. at 649. But see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: The Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1152 (1960).
il E.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953). The argument that discovery leads to the facilitation of perjury appears to be, at best, questionable. The
defendant who actually committed the crime charged will remain silent or rely on
perjured testimony in any case. The argument also presupposes that the criminal sanctions against false testimony and tampering with witnesses are ineffective. The potential
threat of perjury was also raised when discovery was introduced into civil trials, yet,
despite these fears, civil litigation does not seem to have suffered from this innovation.
See generally Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J.
1132, 1154 (1951); Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J.
863, 867 (1933).
7 State v. Rhodes, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910). With the e.xception
of two states which provide for it by statute, there is a constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination in all states. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
8 See, e.g., State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954);
State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1947); Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205,
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On the other hand, the decisions preceding that of the court in the principal
case, have, with a single exception,9 denied the prosecution's request for
discovery in the absence of appropriate statutory authorization. Such statutes as exist are almost entirely limited to situations where the defendant
intends to rely on an alibi or insanity as a defense. The alibi statutes, which
have been adopted in fourteen states, 10 typically preclude the defendant
from raising an alibi defense in the absence of notice to the prosecution
of his intention to do so within a specified time prior to the trial, accompanied by specific information regarding his whereabouts at the time of
the commission of the alleged offense. The eleven states having insanity
defense statutes11 similarly require advance notice and often provide as
well for the disclosure of those witnesses upon whose testimony the defendant intends to rely. Only one statute goes so far as to require each of the
parties to a criminal action to provide his adversary with a list of witnesses
who will be called to trial regardless of the character of the defense.12
80 N.E.2d 825 (1948); People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959); Hameyer
v. State, 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458 (1947); State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62
(1955);, People v. Brown, 272 App. Div. 972, 71 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947); State v. Lacie, 118
Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950); State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407, 171 P.2d 227 (1946).
But see Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952), holding that discovery
should not be allowed in criminal cases in the absence of legislation. There is also a
limited discovery right for the defendant in the federal courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16,
17(c). Under Rule 16, the evidence must be tangible objects, material to the defense,
which were obtained from the defendant by seizure or process. It is usually held that
the defendant may not discover his own statements under Rule 16, though defendants
have fared better in this regard under Rule 17(c). See Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d
17 (5th Cir. 1955); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 194:9). Discovery of
third party statements have been denied under the rules, however. See generally Kaufman,
Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in Federal Courts,
57 CoLU!II. L. REv. 1113 (1957); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 221 (1957).
o McCain v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960), afj'd sub
nom. People v. McCain, 200 Cal. App. 2d 825, 18 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1962). The California
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's granting of reciprocal motions for
discovery in a criminal case. However, the affirmance was based on the fact that the
defendant had made no objection to the prosecution's discovery prior to the granting of
the motion, and therefore had waived the privilege. The court refused to deal with the
question of whether the granting of discovery would be a violation of the privilege
in the absence of waiver.
10 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1631 to -1933 (1956); IowA CODE § 777.18 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 62-1341 (1949); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 768.20-.21 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14
(1947); N.J. RuLES 3:5•9 (1953); N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. § 295-1; Omo REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 2945.58 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1951); S.D. CoDE § 34.2801 (1939); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1958); WIS. STAT. § 955.07
(1959); ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 192B.
11 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (1947); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1016; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-1 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.17 (1944); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1701 (1956); IowA
CoDE § 777.18 (1962); MICH. CO?,IP. LAws §§ 768.20-.21 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-16
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1959); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.030 (1951); AR!z.
R. CRIM. P. 192A.
12 WASH. REv. CoDE § 10.37.030 (1951). However, this statute is of questionable value,
as the trial court may allow additional witnesses so long as the other side has sufficient
time to interview them. If necessary, a continuance will be granted. See State v. Hoggatt,
38 Wash. 2d 932, 234 P.2d 495 (1951).
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The decision of the Supreme Court of California in the principal case
extends the availability of discovery procedures to the prosecution despite
the absence of statutory authorization. 13 This extension constitutes a natural
development of the principles which initially led the same court to grant
discovery to the defendant.14 The decision to permit the defendant to
utilize discovery procedures resulted in part from the court's recognition
that the primary purpose of a criminal trial is the ascertainment of facts,
coupled with a willingness on the part of the court to adopt procedures
thought to be conducive to the full and accurate presentation of competent
evidence relevant to the factual issues in controversy, while, at the same
time, assuring the defendant of a fair hearing. In compelling the disclosure
of relevant information in the possession of the prosecution, the court observed that, with the exception of those instances in which effective law
enforcement might necessitate secrecy, the state had no interest in securing
the conviction of an accused because of the defense's inability either to
cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses effectively, or to anticipate the
nature of the prosecution's case so as to prepare material rebuttal evidence.15
Thus, in order to obtain a conviction, the prosecution was forced to rely
upon the persuasiveness of its evidence rather than upon the tactical advantages which might have been gained from concealment and surprise.
Because of the importance of providing the defendant with an effective
means of fact ascertainment, the court was willing to risk the possibility
that information procured through discovery techniques might be utilized
to fabricate a defense out of perjured testimony. The court, by its decision
in the principal case, recognized that these principles have correlative applicability to the discovery of evidence in the defendant's possession. Insofar as the privilege against self-incrimination and other privileges con13 The only statute dealing with any type of discovery in California requires the
defendant to plead insanity or double jeopardy specially. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1016-17,
1026. The California legislature rejected an alibi statute [Assembly Bill 484 (1961)], with
the opposition to the bill based on the fear that the government might intimidate witnesses. See generally Waddington, Criminal Discovery and the Alibi Defense, 37 L.A.B.
BULL. 7, 26 (1961).
14 In California, the defendant has been permitted to use discovery to obtain access
to transcripts, notes and recordings of his conversations with the police; police records;
written confessions; written statements made by the prosecution's witnesses; and samples
taken from the victim's body, together with autopsy reports. For a summary of the
California decisions, see People v. Norman, 177 Cal. App. 2d 59, 1 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1960).
The granting of criminal discovery to the defendant, while still theoretically in the
discretion of the trial court in California, is given virtually as a matter of course. See
generally Louisell, supra note 3, at 82. But cf. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d
964, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960), in which the trial court's denial of the defendant's blanket
request for all written statements in the possession of the prosecution was upheld on
the ground that the defendant must have a better reason for requesting discovery than
a mere desire to benefit from the entirety of the information assembled by the prosecution. See also People v. Norman, supra, upholding the denial by the trial court of the
defendant's discovery motion made after an adverse verdict on the ground that the
defendant had waived his privilege of discovery. See also cases collected in Louisell,
supra note 3, at 81 n.117.
15 See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d l, 13 (1956).
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£erred by law are inapplicable, the defendant is held to have no legitimate
interest in denying the prosecution access to information in his possession
which might, if disclosed, illuminate the factual issues in controversy and
thereby facilitate their accurate, orderly, and complete resolution. 16 In
order to avoid a possible conflict with the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination, and because the facts of the case necessitated nothing
more, the court allowed discovery of only that information which pertains
to evidence which the defendant intends to produce at trial.17
The major difficulty presented by this decision lies in determining the
extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination limits the availability of discovery to the prosecution. The California Supreme Court has
all but final authority to define the scope of protection afforded by the
privilege, since it is conferred by the state constitution.18 The dissent in
the principal case would construe the privilege as conferring an absolute
right on the defendant to withhold disclosure of any information in his
possession until such time as he might deem disclosure necessary or desirable.19 Such a construction would give the privilege an unnecessarily
double effect. It would not only afford the defendant a safeguard against
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating evidence, but would also provide him with a tactical device that would enable him to withhold the
disclosure of non-incriminatory evidence which he intends to introduce
at the trial until the element of surprise and the unpreparedness of the
prosecution could be fully exploited.20 The majority, on the other hand,
while conceding the propriety of according the defendant protection against
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating evidence, would deny the use of
the privilege as a tactical device which would enable the defendant to
employ the element of surprise at the trial. Because the information pertaining to the evidence which the defendant actually intends to produce
at trial is hardly likely to be of an incriminatory nature, such information
was held not to be protected from discovery by the privilege. Thus, the
decision goes no further than to require disclosure of certain evidence at
a point in time earlier than was theretofore necessary.21 Consequently, the
16 Principal case at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
Id. at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
CONST. art I, § 13. The states have great leeway in defining the scope of
their own privilege against self-incrimination. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 125 (1961).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution has no application to state
criminal proceedings. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
10 Principal case at 923, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
20 The element of surprise in criminal trials is the bane of prosecutors. It is the
problem of the surprise witness who appears at or near the close of the trial to give
testimony, often perjured, favorable to the defense, and thus creating a "reasonable
doubt" as to defendant's guilt, that the alibi statutes have attempted to rectify. See
statutes cited in note IO supra.
21 This argument has been used to uphold the alibi statutes against the challenge
based on the privilege against self-incrimination. See State v. Smetana, 131 Ohio St. 329,
2 N.E.2d 778 (1936); People v. Shulenberg, 279 App. Div. 115, 112 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct.
17

18 CAL.
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majority's decision would appear to preserve the integrity of the privilege
as a safeguard while, at the same time, facilitating the full and accurate
presentation of evidence relevant to the resolution of the factual issues in
controversy. In addition, the decision tends to rectify the procedural imbalance created by the court's earlier decisions granting only the requests
made for discovery by the defendant.2 2
Although the majority is silent on the point, the dissent in the principal
case suggests that the majority's holding limits the availability of discovery
procedures to the prosecution to those instances in which the defendant
intends to raise affirmative defenses.23 Such a limitation would be unfortunate, as it would frustrate the development of any system whereby
discovery procedures would be independently available to both parties in
a criminal trial.24 While the availability of discovery to the prosecution cannot be unlimited, any limitations placed upon it should be based on the
existence of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or any
other privileges conferred by law, rather than upon an attempt to categorize
certain information as discoverable because it relates to the character of
the defense. Rather, the rule should more appropriately be that the defendant must give notice of any and all defenses he intends to raise at
trial and allow the prosecution discovery of information pertaining to such
1952); State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495 (1952). See also State v. Osburn,
171 Kan. 330, 232 P.2d 451 (1951); People v. Longaria, 333 Mich. 696, 53 N.W.2d 685
(1952); State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 149 N.E.2d 583 (1957), each upholding the
trial court's refusal to admit alibi testimony after the defendant had failed to comply
with the statute. See generally Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases,
20 A.B.A.J. 435 (1934).

22 An alternative solution to this problem, possibly more palatable to other courts,
would be to adopt the practice whereby trial courts in their discretion would withhold
discovery from any defendant unwilling to grant a reciprocal privilege to the prosecution.
See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 1198. The trial courts may condition their grant of
discovery to the defendant in any way they see fit, as discovery is not required by due
process in a criminal trial. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1958). Since the
defendant's voluntary acquiescence would operate as a waiver of his privilege against
self-incrimination, conflict on that point would be avoided. Cf. McCain v. Superior
Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960), afj'd sub nom. People v. McCain,
200 Cal. App. 2d 825, 18 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1962); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 2275.
No procedural. advantages would be enjoyed by either party, because discovery would
be granted, if at all, only on a reciprocal basis. However, in those instances where the
defendant would not choose to request discovery, the court's policy of facilitating fact
ascertainment through pre-trial disclosure of information pertinent to the resolution
of factual issues would be frustrated.
23 Principal case at 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The dissent points out that there is
great controversy over what actually constitutes an affirmative defense. It would therefore
be unsatisfactory to allow the availability of discovery to the prosecution to be controlled
by the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense in the case. See also ILL. CRIM.
CODE § 3-2 (1961); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 & comment, at 108 (Tent. Draft. No. 4,
1955).
24 A system of independent discovery is to be distinguished from one of reciprocal
discovery. The former permits either side to avail itself of discovery procedures upon
its own motion. Reciprocal discovery allows discovery to the prosecution only if the
defendant first requests it for himself. See note 22 supra.
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defenses. ~n order to insure compliance with this rule, the defendant should
be precluded from raising any defenses of which he failed to give notice.25
Two limitations to this rule should be recognized. First, the defendant
should be allowed to defeat the discovery motion by the prosecution by
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, if he first satisfies the
court that the information which the prosecution seeks to discover, though
pertinent to his defense, would tend to incriminate him. The prosecution
should also be prevented from discovering such items as memoranda, plans
for presentation, notes of interviews with witnesses, and other items which
go to make up the file of the defendant's counsel.26 The purpose of the
latter limitation is to prevent the prosecution from using the fruits of the
defense counsel's research and analysis in preparing his case. It would be
questionable policy to relieve the prosecution of the duty of ascertaining
for itself the relevance of various statutes and previous judicial decisions
to the cases it brings to trial. Such a rule as that proposed, coupled with
the widespread availability of discovery to the defendant in many states,
would further the interest of society as a whole in having facts ascertained
in all criminal trials.
,
The modem law of criminal procedure reflects the interest of society
in protecting the individual from the power of the state. The many safeguards afforded the defendant are thought to reduce the possibility that
an innocent man will be sent to his death or to prison through involvement
with the judicial process. However, vindication of the innocent, although
certainly one legitimate objective of the criminal law, must be balanced
against the equally important objective of punishing the guilty. Overemphasis on the first-named objective could result in a situation whereby
the verdict in a criminal trial will depend not so much on the justice of
the defendant's cause as on the skill of his counsel in employing the tactical
devices placed in his possession by contemporary procedures. These procedures are the product of a system of law which was based on the traditional
concept that litigious conflict was conducive to the ascertainment of truth.
Discovery has been resisted by those who fear that the introduction of
discovery procedures would undermine the adversary system. Resistance
on this ground is unwarranted, as the availability of such procedures would
enhance the ability of counsel to contest the factual issues in controversy
since they would be better acquainted with the information pertaining
25 The defendant should be allowed to raise any defense which comes to light during
the trial of which he was unaware before trial, even though he has failed to give notice
of it for that reason. In such cases, a two or three-day continuance could be granted in
order that the prosecution may discover information pertaining to the new defense.
Presumably such a continuance would not encroach on the defendant's right to a speedy
trial.
26 Such a limitation is imposed upon discovery procedures in civil litigation, and is
based on the attorney-client privilege. The law is not settled as to exactly what items
should remain non-discoverable under this rule. See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 100 (1954).
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to those issues. In addition, discovery procedures would serve to eradicate
the devices of surprise and concealment which are probably the most undesirable by-products of the adversary system.

Thomas G. Dignan, ]1'.

